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wave towers or satellites, it is extremely
costly to have more than one set of
transmission lines. Because electricity
serves “the greater good,” utilities had
long acted as benevolent monopolies
under the watchful eye of public utilities commissions.
This arrangement worked very well
for many years during the explosive
expansion after WWII when fuel was

and provided broader access to the existing
transmission system. Then in 1996, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) issued a series of policy changes
that created the opening to deregulate. These
new policies required utilities to separate the
transmission of electricity from the business
of generation. The intent of this move was to
encourage transmission providers to “shop
around” for the cheapest electricity and,
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iven the difficulties
encountered by the state
of California in deregulating their electric power
industry, many people are
questioning the wisdom of such a
move. To better understand the motivation behind deregulation, we need to
look at the cost of energy nationwide
in the United States. For example, consider some of the regional energy costs
from August 2001:
Consumers in Texas were paying
$41.50 per MWhour whereas power in
Arizona was going for a high of $49.50
per MWhour. On the same day,
Chicagoans were purchasing their
power for a mere $28.00 per MWhour
<www.enerfax.com, 27 August 2001>.
The difference in energy costs from one
region to another is what is fueling the move
towards deregulation. Consumers want
access to the cheapest energy sources wherever they are located.
Traditionally, electricity customers
have been a captive market: customers
had to purchase power from their
regional utility at its set rate. In
return, the regional utility had an obligation to
serve those customers
with the most reliable
electricity technologically
possible.
Electricity was produced and distributed
regionally with consumers paying the
regional rate.
Consumers lucky
enough to be near
large hydroelectric
plants typically paid
the least amount.
Consumers living in
areas that relied on natural gas or coal
generation frequently paid two to three
times the hydroelectric rate. Utilities
tended to be conservative and took few
risks that might endanger their ability to
serve their customers. New products
and system expansions were planned
years in advance. This approach to business led to a very reliable, but somewhat costly, supply of electricity.
After many of the major industries,
such as banking, shipping and long-distance telephone, started to deregulate, it
was only a matter of time before attention turned to electricity. Electric power
utilities have often been considered a
natural monopoly. Unlike long-distance
carriers that can use individual micro-
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cheap and reliability was the biggest
problem. However, in the 1970s when
fuel prices started showing signs of
volatility, the public’s eye turned
towards ways of producing cheaper
electricity. In 1978, the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) was
passed. It promoted, among other
things, energy conservation and alternate energy. This allowed non-utility
generators (NUGS) access to the transmission system. This act also required
utility companies to purchase power
from the non-utility generators at marginal cost.
PURPA was followed by the 1992
Energy Policy Act (EPA92) that promoted
energy efficiency, the use of alternate fuels,
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thus, to initiate competition and technological innovation among utilities.
Unfortunately, the process of deregulation
has not always been a smooth path for a
variety of reasons.
Unlike many commodities such as
gas, electricity cannot be easily stored—
it must be produced at the moment of
need. Not only must the ability to generate the electricity exist, the ability to
transmit it from the point of generation
to the consumption point must also
exist. Although cheap generation
resources may exist, if the electric
power cannot be transmitted to the
demand site, the customer does not benefit from the lower prices. Or conversely,
since power cannot be stored, unscrupulous suppliers can hold back power, leading to highly variable “spot pricing” during times of high load. Therefore, electric
power deregulation is a two-sided issue:
it concerns both the generation and the
transmission of electricity.
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One problem that unbundling transmission and generation has produced is
the increased overload of certain transmission corridors. Like highways during
rush hour, transmission lines are also
susceptible to congestion and overload.
Before deregulation, when generation and transmission were jointly controlled, generation was decreased at one
site and increased at another to load
alternate transmission paths. This
relieved the congestion.
Nowadays, however, the electricity
suppliers do not always cooperate with
transmission providers to balance the
power flow across the system. Contracts
between supplies and customers typically specify a single contract path
along which the contracted amount of
power will flow. The transmission
provider—along which the contract
path occurs—approves this path.
In reality, however, power flows
across the path of least impedance. The
power may actually flow over a collection of parallel paths to its destination.
This can cause overloads on transmission lines covering large geographic
areas. These overloads are very difficult
to predict and control.
Systems that suffer from severe congestion are said to be transmission limited and are susceptible to cascading failures. On the other hand, systems that do
not have sufficient generation are said
to be generation limited. This is partially the cause of the difficulties encountered by the state of California in 1999
and 2000.
California was one of the first states
to fully embark on a deregulated electricity market. The state government
took a very assertive stance. To encourage competition and the emergence of
new generation suppliers, the California
State’s legislature forced the existing
California utilities to sell off their generation assets. The Legislature’s intent
was to force the utilities to purchase
their power on the spot market so that, in
theory, they would always be able to get
the best deal and the cheapest power.
No long-term contracts were permitted because the California Public
Utilities Commission feared that consumers would be hurt if the prices
dropped in a year or two. Unfortunately,
the daily power purchases subjected
utilities to the volatility of the marketplace. The “last minute” market gave
power producers an incentive to withhold power, creating a buying frenzy,
and prices rocketed upward.
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As a result, California consumers
must be allowed to purchase power
paid $10.9 billion dollars more for elecfrom the cheapest sources, and then
tricity in 2000 than in the previous year.
pass those savings on to their cusFurther aggravating this situation
tomers. Conversely, if the price of elecwas legislation requiring that utilities
tricity increases, that cost increase must
use available state-based alternate eneralso be passed on to consumers. In
gy, or “green power,” often at much
short, the state of California did not
higher prices than traditionally produced
allow the principles of supply and
power. Southern California Edison has
demand to take hold. Deregulation has
paid $25 billion more for electricity
the potential to bring savings to conunder alternative energy contracts over
sumers nationwide—if allowed to
the lifetime of this legislation.
progress unfettered by legislative
But perhaps the fatal nail in the cofrestrictions.
fin was the rate cap placed by the legisAbout the author
lators on the amount utilities could
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